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Florida’s courts often use contempt sanctions as a highly effective
means of enforcing final divorce decrees.” Accordingly, when a party
fails to comply with a provision of the divorce order, the recalcitrant
party may be threatened with imprisonment.
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Florida's courts often use contempt sanctions as a highly effective
means of enforcing final divorce decrees." Accordingly, when a party
fails to comply with a provision of the divorce order, the recalcitrant
party may be threatened with imprisonment. This threat ensures rapid
compliance with the duty the final decree imposes.2 The recent action
of a Dade County circuit judge exemplifies the effectiveness of such a
threat. Judge Rainwater cited 480 men in contempt of court over a
four day period.' Of the 480 men cited, 440 immediately paid the owed
family support ordered by their respective divorce decrees.4
The Florida Constitution, however, limits the courts' extraordinary
power to coerce: "No person shall be imprisoned for a debt, except in
cases of fraud."' 5 Therefore, it is imperative a court determine, prior to
exercising its power, whether a debt is the underlying cause for the
imposition of contempt and subsequent imprisonment. Courts have had
particular difficulty making this determination regarding property set-
tlements incorporated into final divorce decrees." Florida courts, in par-
ticular, have reached conflicting conclusions when determining whether
these settlements are enforceable through contempt of court.
If a court considers property settlements as merely imposing a




5. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
6. Compare Collins v. Collins, 179 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) and
Firestone v. Ferguson, 372 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) holding the respec-
tive parties in contempt for failure to comply with a provision of a property settlement
agreement incorporated into final divorce decrees with Howell v. Howell, 207 So. 2d
507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) and Carlin v. Carlin, 310 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) holding contempt is not an available remedy to enforce property settle-
ment agreements incorporated into final divorce decrees.
7 See note 6 supra.
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debt, it should not punish the debtor by using its contempt power to
enforce the decree. This note will attempt to set forth certain guidelines
a Florida court might use in determining when a property settlement
incorporated in a final divorce decree constitutes a debt. In such cases
the decree is unenforceable through contempt because of Florida's con-
stitutional guarantee.
Contempt
In order for any judicial system to function smoothly, its courts
must have the ability to enforce their decrees. One such means of en-
forcement is the power of contempt. Florida defines contempt as "[a]
refusal to obey any legal order, mandate or decree, made or given by
any judge either in term time or in vacation relative to any business of
said court, after due notice thereof...."s
When the court seeks to punish a party for violating a judicial
decree, it initiates criminal contempt proceedings. 9 When a private
party initiates proceedings for the purpose of coercing another party
into action or non-action, the proceedings are for civil contempt.10 At
times, the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is nebulous.
The Florida Supreme Court discussed the differences and the. difficulty
of making the distinctions between the two in Pugliese v. Pugliese.11
Tina and Rocco Pugliese were divorced in 1975. The final divorce
decree ordered Rocco to vacate the marital dwelling. Subsquent to en-
try of final judgment, Rocco's attorney filed motions for a new trial,
stay of execution of judgment and notice of hearing. The attorney ad-
vised Rocco the judgment requiring surrender of the premises was
stayed pending final determination of the motions. Thus, Rocco refused
to vacate the marital dwelling.
Upon Rocco's refusal to vacate, Tina Pugliese filed a motion for
contempt and a notice of hearing. The judge held Rocco in contempt of
8. FLA. STAT. § 38.23 (1979); see also FLA. STAT. § 38.22 (1979) which states
that "[e]very court may punish contempts against it whether such contempts be direct,
indirect, or constructive, and in any such proceedings the court shall proceed to hear
and determine all questions of law and fact."
9. In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
10. Id.
11. 347 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977).
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court for willfully refusing to vacate the premises as required by the
divorce decree. Rocco was sentenced to thirteen days in county jail, but
the order did not provide Rocco with an opportunity to purge his con-
tempt by fulfilling the decree requirements which would terminate the
sentence. Florida's Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the deci-
sion without opinion.1 2
To properly review the decision, the Florida Supreme Court had to
determine whether the order was for civil or criminal contempt.13 In
doing so the court stated that "if the purpose of the proceedings is to
coerce action or non-action by a party, the order of contempt is civil. '14
In civil contempt, the party seeking to coerce the action or non-action
initiates the proceedings. The judge then would hold the non-complying
party in contempt for the "private benefit of the offended party."'15
Criminal contempt, on the other hand, punishes rather than co-
erces. It is maintained solely and simply to "vindicate the authority of
the court or to punish otherwise for conduct offensive to the public in
violation of an order of the court."'" Criminal contempt can be either
direct or indirect.
A direct criminal contempt is one committed in the "presence of
the court.' 1 7 Oftentimes this type of conduct occurs during the course
of. a trial. For example, in Olds v. State, a judge held the public de-
fender in direct contempt of court.' The holding stemmed from the
judge's displeasure with the public defender's continued efforts to im-
peach an important state's witness. The witness had been previously
represented by the public defender's office and the judge felt the con-
tinued effort to impeach the witness violated the attorney-client privi-
lege. This violation prompted the judge to hold the attorney in direct
criminal contempt.
Although the decision to hold someone in contempt is generally
left to the trial court's discretion, Florida's Fourth District Court of
12. Id. at 424.
13. Id.
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id.
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Demetree v. State, 89 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1956).
18. 302 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
3151
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Appeal reversed the Olds contempt order.1 9 The court concluded the
trial judge erred in believing the information sought by the public de-
fender was privileged: the subject matter of the attempted cross exami-
nation included statements by the state's witness made in the presence
of third parties and involved matters of public record. Based on these
facts, the appellate court found the information was not privileged and
the trial court's order for direct criminal contempt could not stand.20
In contrast to direct criminal contempt, an indirect criminal con-
tempt is one committed "outside the presence of the court.' 21 For ex-
ample, in Demetree v. State,2 a judge held the defendant in contempt
of court for violating an order enjoining him from operating a house of
prostitution. The judge sentenced the defendant to six months in the
Dade County Jail.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the Demetree order for indi-
rect criminal contempt.23 It stated that typically, an indirect criminal
contempt proceeding is brought on behalf of the public.24 Here, the
injunction was obtained by the county solicitor in the name of the State
of Florida. The alleged contemptuous conduct was not committed
against the county solicitor as an individual, but was committed against
the public at large. The trial court had sustained its burden of showing,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant was guilty of contemptuous
conduct by continuing the operation of his brothel. Therefore, the order
for indirect criminal contempt was valid.2 5
Preliminarily, the court must decide who was offended by the con-
temptuous conduct since this determines whether direct or indirect
criminal contempt was committed or whether civil contempt was com-
mitted. In Pugliese, the Florida Supreme Court found Rocco's conduct
in failing to obey the court order to vacate could be subject either to
indirect criminal contempt proceedings or civil contempt proceedings.26
The supreme court rejected Tina's argument that by admitting in open
19. Id.
20. Id. at 790.
21. 89 So. 2d at 501.
22. Id. at 500.
23. Id. at 501.
24. Id. at 503.
25. Id. at 502.
26. 347 So. 2d at 424.
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court, at the contempt hearing, he had defied the terms of the divorce
order Rocco committed a direct criminal contempt. A judge must al-
ways hear testimony in his presence at a hearing for indirect criminal
contempt. Declaring that this testimony constituted conduct equivalent
to direct criminal contempt would obliterate the distinctions between
direct and indirect criminal contempt.2 7 Thus, Rocco's conduct could
not constitute a direct criminal contempt and the more stringent stan-
dards for an indirect criminal contempt proceeding applied.,
To determine whether the proceeding was for criminal or civil con-
tempt, the supreme court in Pugliese looked to the language of the
order itself. Orders for civil contempt classically include a purging pro-
vision whereby the contemnor can terminate the senteice upon compli-
ance with the court ordered action.29 Since the Pugliese order lacked
this purging provision it was an atypical civil contempt order.30
Turning to whether the order could be classified as one for indirect
criminal contempt, the supreme court in Pugliese looked to the proce-
dure followed by the lower court prior to adjudging Rocco in contempt.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840 spells out the procedural re-
quirements31 to initiate an indirect criminal contempt proceeding. Since
27. Id. at 426.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 424.
30. Id.
31. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.840. Indirect Criminal Contempt:
(a) Indirect (Constructive) Criminal Contempt. A criminal contempt
except as provided in the preceding subsection concerning direct con-
tempts, shall be prosecuted in the following manner:
(1) Order to Show Cause. The judge, of his own motion or upon af-
fadavit of any person
(2) Motions; Answer. The defendant, personally or by counsel, may
move to dismiss the order to show cause, move for a statement of particu-
lars or answer such order by way of explanation or defense. All motions
and the answer shall be in writing unless specified otherwise by the judge.
A defendant's omission to file motions or answer shall not be deemed as an
admission of guilt of the contempt charged.
(3) Order of Arrest; Bail. The judge may issue an order of arrest of
the defendant if the judge has reason to believe the defendant will not
appear in response to the order to show cause. The defendant shall be ad-
mitted to bail in the manner provided by law in criminal cases.
(4) Arraignment; Hearing. The defendant may be arraigned at the
3171Contempt & Florida Divorce Decrees16:1982
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these requirements were not met, Rocco was not given notice of the
consequences that might follow the hearing. 2 Thus, because the trial
court's order failed to adhere to procedural requirements for criminal
contempt nor contained a purging clause, as required for civil con-
tempt, the order for contempt could not stand whether classified as ei-
ther criminal or civil. The supreme court reversed the Second District
time of the hearing, or prior thereto upon his request. A hearing to deter-
mine the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall follow a plea of not
guilty. The judge may conduct a hearing without assistance of counsel or
may be assisted by the prosecuting attorney or by an attorney appointed
for that purpose. The defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel,
have compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses, and may testify
in his own defense.
All issues of law and fact shall be heard and determined by the judge.
(5) Disqualification of Judge. If the contempt charged involves disre-
spect to or criticism of a judge he shall disqualify himself from presiding
at the hearing. Another judge shall be designated by the chief justice of
the Supreme Court.
(6) Verdict; Judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing the judge
shall sign and enter or record a judgment of guilty or not guilty. There
should be included in a judgment of guilty a recital of the facts constitut-
ing the contempt of which the defendant has been found and adjudicated
guilty.
(7) The Sentence; Indirect Contempt. Prior to the pronouncement of
sentence, the judge shall inform the defendant of the accusation and judg-
ment against him and inquire as to whether he has any cause to show why
sentence should not be pronounced. The defendant shall be afforded the
opportunity to present evidence of mitigating circumstances. The sentence
shall be pronounced in open court and in the presence of the defendant.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.830. Direct Criminal Contempt:
A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the court saw or heard
the conduct constituting the contempt committed in the actual presence of
the court. The judgment of guilt of contempt shall include a recital of
those facts upon which the adjudication of guilt is based. Prior to the adju-
dication of guilt the judge shall inform the defendant of the accusation
against him and inquire as to whether he has any cause to show why he
should not be adjudged guilty of contempt by the Court and sentenced
therefore. The defendant shall be given the opportunity to present evidence
of excusing or mitigating circumstances. The judgment shall be signed by
the judge and entered of record. Sentence shall be pronounced in open
court.
32. 347 So. 2d at 426.
1 318 6:1982 1
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Court of Appeal and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with
its opinion. 33
The Pugliese case illustrates that non-compliance with the provi-
sions of a divorce decree may be subject to either civil or criminal con-
tempt proceedings. Generally, non-compliance is characterized as a
civil contempt because the purpose of the proceeding is to "preserve
and enforce rights of private litigants to compel obedience to orders
and decrees of the court made for the benefit of such parties." '34 Usu-
ally the party who has not received family support payments (either
permanent alimony or child support) initiates civil contempt proceed-
ings to coerce the other party into making the delinquent payments.
3 5
The sentence imposed as a result of a finding of civil contempt contin-
ues until the recalcitrant party fulfills his or her obligation.
When the purpose of the contempt proceeding is coercive, the trial
judge is required to make an affirmative finding:
(1) The petitioner presently has the ability to comply with the or-
33. Id. at 427.
34. Deter v. Deter, 353 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
35. 180 So. 2d at 379.
Civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by the aggrieved
party or those who succeed to their rights or someone who has an interest
in the right to be protected. Due process of law requires that the party
accused be advised of the charge and accorded opportunity to defend him-
self. In these proceedings there is no presumption of innocence and the
burden of proof is upon the party bringing the charge to prove the facts
charged by a preponderance of the evidence. Where a court order and its
violation are established or admitted the burden is on the accused to show
facts which would excuse his default. If the defense or excuse is that of
inability to comply, the accused has the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence such inability. This is based upon the fact that the
making of the order involved an implicit finding of ability to comply. Thus
there must be an affirmative finding appearing on the commitment order
that it is within the power of the accused to obey the order and, conversely,
imprisonment is not available if the accused is unable to comply. It is for
this reason often stated that the accused carries the keys of his prison in
his pocket. In Florida it has been held that imprisonment for civil con-
tempt must be for a fixed term and must include a specifically stated pro-
vision for purging. The fixed term requirement was imposed without stat-
ing whether the contempt was civil or criminal. As a general rule a fixed
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der and willfully refuses to do so, or (2) that the petitioner previ-
ously had the ability to comply but divested himself of that ability
through his fault or neglect designed to frustrate the intent and
purpose of the order.36
The Florida Supreme Court spelled out this requirement in Faircloth v.
Faircloth, where it remanded the case because the lower court had not
made the required determination prior to exercising its contempt
power.37 Apparently, the reason behind making this determination is to
assure that the contemnor has the ability to comply with the order.
Otherwise, the purpose of the proceeding would have to be something
other than coercion. The trial court in Faircloth had held the former
husband in contempt because his child support payments were in ar-
rears and because he failed to comply with other provisions of the di-
vorce decree. He was sentenced to the county detention center for five
months and twenty-nine days or until he paid the money owed. 38
Duties Enforceable Through Contempt
Florida considers court ordered imposition of family support pay-
ments a legally imposed duty rather than a debt.39 The language used
in the Florida statutes, allowing the court to impose family support ob-
ligations, reflects this conclusion: "The court may at any time order
either or both parents a duty of support to the child. . .. -40 The con-
stitutional prohibition against imprisonment for a debt is circumvented
by this analysis.41
Although the Florida statute allowing the court to impose alimony
does not expressly mention the word "duty," 42 it is referred to in a
36. Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1976).
37. Id. at 651.
38. Id.
39. Bronk v. State, 43 Fla. 461, 465, 31 So. 2d 248, 252 (1901).
40. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
41. 43 Fla. at 465, 31 So. 2d at 252.
42. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1979).
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant
alimony to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or permanent
in nature. In any award of alimony, the court may order periodic payments
or payments in lump sum or both. The court may consider the adultery of
8
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related statute. Florida Statute § 61.12 sets forth the procedure neces-
sary to garnish or attach amounts due for alimony and child support.
Subsection (2) of the statute states, the court through issuance of a
"writ may provide that the salary of any person having a duty of sup-
port pursuant to said order be garnished on a periodic and continuing
basis for as long as the court may determine. . .. ,,43The Florida Su-
preme Court has interpreted the obligation of family support (perma-
nent alimony or child support) as a legally imposed duty. The supreme
court reflected this view in McRae v. McRae: "The law imposes on
[the] civilized [person] the duty to provide food, shelter and raiment
for his [or her] own."44
Because courts consider imposition of family support imposition of
a legal duty, they will enforce family support orders through contempt
of court when policy considerations justify such action. As early as
1901, the Florida Supreme Court decided in Bronk v. State45 that con-
tempt of court can be exercised to enforce the obligation of family sup-
port. The Bronk decision was based on the court's belief that:
a spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining whether alimony
shall be awarded to such spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be
awarded.
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the
court shall consider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited
to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties.
(d) The financial resources of each party.
(e) Where applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable him or her to find appropriate
employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not
limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education and ca-
reer building of the other party.
The court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties.
43. FLA. STAT. § 61.12(2) (1979).
44. 52 So. 2d 908, 909 (Fla. 1951) citing Pollack v. Pollack, 159 Fla. 224, 225,
31 So. 2d 253, 254 (1947).
45. 43 Fla. 461, 31 So. 248 (1901).
321 1
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Alimony or maintenance from the husband to the wife is not a
debt, within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for a debt. It is regarded more in light of a personal
duty due not only from the husband to the wife, but from him to
society, that courts of equity have the power to enforce by deten-
tion of the person of the husband in cases where he can discharge it
but will not.46
A policy consideration implicit in this argument is to make the husband
pay support so that the wife and family do not become a burden on
society.
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal reiterated this view in
Chapman v. Lamm: "Contempt for failure to pay court ordered ali-
mony or child support is based upon the fact that such obligations arise
out of the duty owed and that, in accordance with public necessity,
dependents must be supported."47
It is interesting to note, however, in Chapman the appellate court
reversed the trial court's decision holding the former husband in con-
tempt of court because part of the obligation of support had been con-
verted into a debt to a third party.48 Joe Chapman had been committed
to the Dade County Jail for ninety days or until he paid the clerk of
the court $8,170 in overdue child support payments. Part of this
amount, $2,987.50, had been converted into a debt owed to the State of
Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. On appeal,
Chapman argued the order was reversible because it purported to im-
prison him for a debt owed to a third party, the State of Florida.4 9
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal agreed and said the obligation
"no longer carried the public necessity for enforcement by imprison-
ment. ''50 That part of the money owed to the State of Florida would
not be used to support the children, and consequently public policy did
not support the court's exercise of its contempt power.
Courts will not imprison parties for failure to render payment of
46. Id. at 463, 31 So. at 252.
47. 388 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 7 Fla. L. Weekly 124
(March 12, 1982). See infra note 116.
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family support unless policy reasons, such as continued maintenance
and nourishment of the family, justify such action.51 In other words,
public necessity must justify court exercise of contempt power. Flor-
ida's First District Court of Appeal reflected this view when it stated in
Smith v. Morgan that once public necessity no longer exists, "the pur-
pose and justification for the extraordinary power of contempt
expires. '52
In Morgan, the lower court found the former husband in contempt
of court for failure to make child support payments in arrears. 53 The
facts demonstrated upon dissolution of marriage in 1963, the husband
was ordered to pay child support. In 1979, the circuit court entered an
order abating the child support obligation because the 17 year old son
was residing with the former husband and consequently was deriving
support directly from the former husband. On the same day the court
entered the abatement order the former husband was held in contempt.
The judge sentenced him to five months and twenty-nine days in jail.5
On appeal, the husband argued that the circuit court was without juris-
diction to punish, through contempt, the failure to pay child support
arrearages once the obligation of support had been abated.55 Florida's
First District Court of Appeal agreed and found the order for abate-
ment "eliminated the public necessity for the extraordinary remedy of
contempt since the father is now supporting the child directly." 56
In Morgan, because the trial court was without jurisdiction to
punish the appellant by contempt, the wife's remedy for recovery of
child support arrearages was limited to a judgment by "ordinary civil
proceedings. 57 The circuit court was without jurisdiction to use its
power of contempt to enforce payment of child support in arrears once
the child had reached the age of majority.58 No sufficient policy reasons
justify court exercise of contempt power to enforce child support pay-
51. Smith v. Morgan, 379 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
52. Id. at 1053.
53. Id. at 1052.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1053.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Wilkes v. Revels, 245 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
11
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ment when the child is no longer a minor.59
On the other hand, a policy consideration supporting the court's
exercise of contempt power is that orders for family support are modifi-
able.60 Family support orders for alimony and child support generally
59. Id.
60. FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1979).
Modification of alimony judgments, agreements, etc.-
(1) When the parties have entered into, or hereafter enter into, an
agreement for payments for, or instead of, support, maintenance, or ali-
mony, whether in connection with a proceeding for dissolution or separate
maintenance or with any voluntary property settlement, or when a party is
required by court order to make any payments, and the circumstances or
the financial ability of either party has changed or the child or children
who are beneficiaries of an agreement or court order as described herein
have reached the age of 18 years since the execution of such agreement or
the rendition of the order, either party may apply to the Circuit Court of
the circuit in which the parties, or either of them, resided at the date of
the execution of the agreement or reside at the date of the application, or
in which the agreement was executed or in which the order was rendered,
for a judgment decreasing or increasing the amount of support, mainte-
nance, or alimony, and the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity
requires, with due regard to the changed circumstances or the financial
ability of the parties or the child or children, decreasing, increasing, or
confirming the amount of separate support, maintenance, or alimony pro-
vided for in the agreement or order.
(2) When an order is modified pursuant to subsection (1), the party
having an obligation to pay shall pay only the amount of support, mainte-
nance, or alimony directed in the new order, and the agreement or earlier
order is modified accordingly. No person shall commence, or cause to be
commenced, as party or attorney or agent or otherwise, in behalf of either
party in any court, an action or proceeding otherwise than as herein pro-
vided, nor shall any court have jurisdiction to entertain any action or pro-
ceeding otherwise than as herein provided to enforce the recovery of sepa-
rate support, maintenance, or alimony otherwise than pursuant to the
order.
(3) This section is declaratory of existing public policy and of laws of
this state which are hereby confirmed in accordance with the provisions
hereof. It is the duty of the Circuit Court to construe liberally the provi-
sions hereof to effect the purposes hereof.
(4) If a party applies for a reduction of alimony or child support and
the circumstances justify the reduction, the court may make the reduction
of alimony or child support regardless of whether or not the party applying
for it has fully paid the accrued obligations to the other party at the time
12
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continue over extended periods of time; often the circumstances sur-
rounding support payment change substantially. For instance, a former
spouse may remarry or the needs of a child might increase or decrease.
Thus, it is necessary that orders for family support be flexible to fit
changed circumstances. Upon sufficiently changed circumstances, ei-
ther party to the divorce may request the judge to modify a family
support order to reflect the changes that have occurred.61 Since these
orders are modifiable, thereby giving the recalcitrant party no excuse
for continued disobedience of the order, courts are more willing to exer-
cise their extraordinary contempt powers to enforce orders. The former
spouse could have had the order modified if he felt the order was exces-
sive and sufficiently changed circumstances justified modification of the
order."2
In addition to necessary family support payments, court ordered
payment of attorney's fees for services rendered during the divorce is
not considered a debt.63 The reason for placing legal fees in the same
category as family support obligations is unclear. Arguably, the policy
behind treating court ordered legal fees as a duty is to ensure that both
parties will retain competent legal counsel throughout divorce proceed-
ings.6 Because courts are willing to treat court ordered legal fees as
imposing a duty, they are able to use contempt powers to enforce such
orders avoiding constitutional stricture against debtor imprisonment."
Debts Not Enforceable Through Contempt
Property settlements incorporated into final divorce decrees have
given courts particular difficulty in deciding whether they should be
enforced through contempt proceedings or by ordinary civil proceedings
available to creditors against debtors. Two Florida district courts of ap-
peal have decided that property settlements incorporated into final di-
of the application or at the time of the order of modification.
61. Id. § 1.
62. Howard v. Howard, 207 So. 2d 90 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
63. Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112, 192 So. 2d 466 (1939).
64. See Price v. Price, 382 So. 2d 433, 437 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
65. Harrison v. Harrison, 178 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Law-
rence v. Lawrence, 384 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
3251
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vorce decrees may be enforced through contempt of court.66
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal upheld use of contempt to
enforce a property settlement incorporated into a final divorce decree in
Firestone v. Ferguson.67 The Firestones were divorced in 1974. The
final divorce judgment included a property settlement with a provision
that Myrna Firestone, the former wife, sell a farm in Kentucky and
split the proceeds equally with her former husband, Russell. The agree-
ment also provided Russell pay Myrna $5,000 per month in alimony.68
During a court hearing, Myrna indicated she would be willing to
sell the property for $5,000 per acre. 9 Thereafter, a Kentucky corpora-
tion offered her $4,700 per acre for the farm. Myrna refused to sign
the sale papers and the offer expired. Russell moved to compel Myrna
to comply with the settlement agreement. Judge Ferguson, a Dade
County circuit court judge, held Myrna in contempt of court. He gave
her ten days within which to execute the offer and agreement for sale.
When she refused, the judge relieved Russell from paying further
alimony.70
The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, but indi-
cated the possibility of a different result had the property settlement
called merely for the payment of money. This possibility was premised
on the general rule that "the contempt process may not be utilized to
enforce payments required under a property settlement agreement."71
However, the court found the general rule inapplicable to the facts of
Firestone because the contempt proceedings were initiated to compel
Myrna to execute a contract for the sale of property, not to make pay-
ments of money.72
Similarly, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal in Collins v.
Collins held the trial court did not err by holding Marion Collins in
contempt of court for failing to make mortgage payments pursuant to a
66. 179 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); 372 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1979).
67. 372 So. 2d 490.
68. Id. at 491.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 492.
72. Id.
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property settlement.73 Marion and Nannie Lou Collins were divorced in
1963 and their final divorce decree incorporated a stipulation to the
property settlement whereby Marion would make mortgage payments
on certain properties. In 1964 the trial court adjudged Marion in con-
tempt of court for falure to make the required payments. He was sen-
tenced to sixty days in jail.7' The Collins decision seems to violate the
general rule espoused in the Firestone's dicta which prohibits use of
contempt proceedings to enforce a property settlement calling for pay-
ment of money.
Other cases strictly adhere to the general rule found in Firestone,
which Collins seemingly did not follow.7 5 These cases hold that con-
tempt of court is unavailable to enforce property settlements which
merely impose a debt upon one of the former spouses.
For instance, in Howell v. Howell, Florida's Second District Court
of Appeal followed the general rule.76 A property settlement agreement
had been incorporated into the final divorce decree of William and
Thelma Howell in 1959. 77 In pertinent part, the agreement provided:
The husband in full and complete settlement and discharge of all
obligations to the wife for alimony, support and maintenance,
dower or claim of the wife against the husband or against his es-
tate, agree[d] to pay to the wife the sum of $100.00 per week....
The husband agree[d] that there would be no abatement in the
weekly payments hereinabove provided for any reason whatsoever
except the remarriage of the wife. .. Y8
In addition, the parties stipulated "[t]he settlement agreement ...
contained [a] full and complete payment and satisfaction of all ali-
mony, maintenance, support, court costs . . . [and] neither party
[would] ask for, nor be entitled to any other settlement. .. ."
Three years after the decree's execution, William unsuccessfully
73. 179 So. 2d 231.
74. Id.
75. Howell v. Howell, 207 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Carlin v.
Carlin, 310 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
76. 207 So. 2d 507.





Thomas: The Use Of Contempt Of Court To Enforce Florida Divorce Decrees
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
328 Nova Law Journal 6:1982
petitioned the court to reduce the "alimony" payments.8 0 The judge
held the agreement was a property settlement because the agreement
was for the transfer of property rights and not for continued mainte-
nance of the wife. The sum of money called alimony was actually the
consideration paid to the wife for the transfer of her property rights.81
Because the agreement was actually a property settlement it was not
modifiable.82 Property settlement agreements are contracts to distribute
property upon dissolution of marriage and when fairly and voluntarily
entered into, the courts will not disturb them.8 The former husband
appealed and Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed.
In November of 1964, Thelma petitioned the court to hold Wil-
liam in contempt.8 4 For some sixty-nine weeks, William had only paid
$50.00 per week instead of the $100.00 per week he was required to
pay under the final divorce decree. 5 William argued that when the
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
his petition for modification, it fixed the legal status of the original
agreement as a property settlement rather than purely an agreement to
pay alimony.86 Consequently, the payments to Thelma under the agree-
ment constituted an ordinary contractual obligation enforceable only as
between creditor and debtor.8 7 William urged contempt proceedings
were improper since this was not a default of alimony payments but
rather a failure to fulfill the contractual obligations of the property set-
tlements. The appellate court noted that whether the contempt pro-
ceeding could be used to enforce these payments depended on whether
the payments fulfilled an alimony or property settlement agreement."
The court admitted that often it was difficult to determine whether the
agreement constituted alimony or a property settlement.
The court in Howell found alimony to mean "nourishment" or
80. Id. at 510.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Bergman v.
Bergman, 145 Fla. 10, 199 So. 2d 920 (1940).
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"sustenance."89 That is, alimony continues to sustain a former spouse
in a lifestyle to which he or she had become accustomed prior to the
divorce, within the means of the other spouse. If, on the other hand, the
periodic payments were made in consideration for relinquishment of
property rights, they should be classified as payments pursuant to the
executed property settlement.90 The court aptly summarized this
method of classification: "It is the substance and not the form which is
controlling." The use of the term "alimony" in the property settlement
agreement is not conclusive.91
On final analysis, the court agreed with William's argument that
when the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of his
previous petition for modification, it fixed the "law of the case" as to
the legal classification of the payments.92 Thus, the appellate court was
bound to characterize these payments as those pursuant to a property
settlement, unenforceable through contempt. 93 Thelma was limited to
the usual remedies available to a creditor against her debtor.9 To allow
otherwise, said the court, would result in imprisonment for a debt.
In Carlin v. Carlin,95 the Fourth District Court of Appeal broad-
ened the general rule articulated in the Firestone dicta. The facts
showed the husband voluntarily entered into a property settlement
agreement which was incorporated into the final divorce decree. The
former wife failed to comply with a provision of the agreement and was
therefore adjudged in contempt of the final judgment for dissolution of
marriage.98 The appellate court reversed the contempt order on the
grounds that when the property settlement agreement is fairly and vol-
untarily entered into, its "violation. . . is not enforceable by contempt
but only by the usual remedies available to a creditor against his
debtor." 97 This broadens the general rule in that it prohibits the use of
contempt to enforce any property settlement agreement and not just
89. Id. at 511 citing Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1953).
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one requiring the payment of money.
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal later retreated some-
what from the rule in Carlin, in Burke v. Burke,98 where it held pay-
ments required under terms of a property settlement agreement could
not be enforced by contempt proceedings.99 Prior to dissolution of their
marriage, Joseph and Doris Burke entered into a property settlement
agreement which was incorporated in the final divorce decree. The set-
tlement agreement stipulated that Joseph was to pay Doris $1,956.26.
In addition he was to execute and deliver to Doris the joint income tax
return for 1974 together with a check in the amount of one-half the
taxes due. Finally, Joseph was also to execute and deliver to Doris all
documents necessary to release to her all his interests in a note and
mortgage and transfer all of his interests in certain securities. Joseph
failed to comply with any of these provisions which prompted Doris to
file a motion to enforce the agreement through civil contempt. 00
The trial court held the former husband in contempt of court. The
appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part.10 1 Regarding the
money Joseph owed to Doris, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held
it was clearly a payment required under the terms of a property settle-
ment, unenforceable through contempt proceedings. 10 2 The court,
therefore, reversed that part of the trial court's order holding Joseph in
contempt for failure to execute and deliver the joint tax return and a
check for taxes due for the same reason.103
The court was faced with a different situation regarding the re-
maining portion of the lower court's order requiring Joseph to execute
and deliver certain documents. T10 These acts did not involve holding the
former husband in contempt of court for failure to make an agreed
payment pursuant to a property settlement agreement, but rather or-
dered he comply with the obligations assumed in the agreement.10 5 The
effect of incorporating the agreement into the final divorce decree cou-
98. 336 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
99. Id. at 1238.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1239.
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pled with the trial court's order for compliance was a "mandatory or-
der to specific 'performance of that act,"'016 which the court found dis-
tinguishable from the payment of money.
The court in Burke indicated that because the trial court was in
effect ordering Joseph to specifically perform the act, Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.570 applied.107 Florida's procedural requirements
provided, in part: "If any other judgment, injunction or mandatory or-
der for the specific performance of any act or contract is not complied
with, the court may hold the disobedient party for contempt ... "108
The trial court ordered Joseph to specifically perform certain acts
which did not involve payment of money. The former husband's failure
to comply was willful and deliberate, and not caused by inability to
perform. Under these circumstances, the court held the trial court had
the authority to enforce its order by holding the former husband in
contempt.109
Upon final analysis, it seems the rule regarding the enforcement of
property settlement agreements incorporated into final divorce decrees
swings from extreme to extreme. On one hand, as in Collins, contempt
of court is available to coerce a former spouse to make required mort-
gage payments. On the other hand, as in Carlin, contempt of court is
never an available remedy to enforce property settlement agreements
incorporated into final divorce decrees. The more moderate approach
was exhibited by Benson v. Benson, where Florida's Fourth District
Court of Appeal stated: "Failure to make payments pursuant to a pure
property settlement is not the subject of contempt proceedings, .
Conclusion
Florida courts have, on occasion, reached conflicting conclusions
when addressing the issue of whether contempt is available as a remedy
to enforce property settlement agreements incorporated into final di-
vorce decrees. It seems clear that contempt is an available remedy to
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with regard to property settlement agreements?
One source giving rise to confusion is Florida's constitutional pro-
hibition against imprisonment of debtors.""1 Judicial construction of
this provision does not prohibit court use of contempt as a means of
enforcing family support obligations because these obligations are not
classified as debts, but rather are viewed as legally imposed special du-
ties. Therefore, when the court threatens a party with imprisonment for
failure to comply with a family support provision, it is coercing that
party's compliance with a legally imposed duty. The court is not threat-
ening the party with imprisonment as a means of enforcing a debt, and
consequently does not violate Florida's constitutional guarantee in this
respect.
The situation is different when a property settlement agreement is
involved. Property settlement agreements create no special duties upon
the parties. They are merely contracts distributing property between
husband and wife upon dissolution of marriage.' 12 When freely and vol-
untarily entered by the parties, these contracts are not disturbed and
courts treat them like any other.' 13 Unlike family support orders, these
settlement agreements are not modifiable.
Unpaid money obligations arising from settlement agreements are
considered debts. Because courts must be careful not to violate the pro-
hibition against imprisoning debtors, they follow the general rule that
contempt of court is not an available remedy to enforce these pay-
ments.- 4 Therefore, the party seeking relief is limited to those proceed-
ings any creditor would have against his debtor." 5
Another source of confusion is, unlike cases presented by breached
family support obligations, there really are no sufficient policy reasons
justifying contempt for property settlement violations. Property settle-
ment agreements are not intended to assure continued "sustenance" or
"nourishment" to the family, and a party's failure to comply with a
settlement provision does not necessarily mean a family will go without
support. Why, then, should a court exercise its extraordinary power of
contempt merely to enforce a contract to distribute property?
111. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
112. Benson, 369 So. 2d 99.
113. Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1953).
114. 207 So. 2d 507.
115. 310 So. 2d 403.
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Certain guidelines might be useful to a court in determining
whether a divorce order is enforceable through contempt. First the
court should determine the source of the obligation for which enforce-
ment is sought. If the court determines the source of obligation arises
from a duty of family support then contempt may be an available rem-
edy. The court must then determine whether policy considerations jus-
tify the exercise of its extraordinary power of contempt.11 6
If, on the other hand, the obligation arises from an agreement to
distribute property, the court should be careful in exercising its power
of contempt, lest a debtor be imprisoned. If courts treat these agree-
ments like any other contract, the non-breaching party is afforded only
those remedies sounding in contract. Perhaps, however, in cases of seri-
ous violation of a property settlement agreement, a court might impose
punative damages to deter future violations of serious magnitude.
The Burke decision laid down a particularly appealing approach
where the court said it was enforcing the contract through its power of
contempt because it had ordered the party to specifically perform the
contract.11  The courts should be allowed to order a party to specifi-
cally perform a property settlement where the contract demands such
action and there is no adequate remedy at law. Because specific per-
formance, an equitable remedy, usually does not involve the payment of
money, the court could circumvent the Florida proscription against im-
116. After this note was committed to print, the Florida Supreme Court reversed
the Third District Court of Appeal in Chapman v. Lamm, 7 Fla. L. Weekly 124
(March 12, 1982). The supreme court recognized the general rule when a debt based
upon an assignment of the right to receive child support payments is owed to a private
third party (a bank for example), contempt of court is not an available means of en-
forcing that debt. See State ex rel. Cahn v. Mason, 148 Fla. 264, 2 So. 2d 255 (1941).
However, when the state demonstrates sufficient public policy reasons, contempt of
court is an available means of enforcing the child support payments owed to the state.
Section 409.2561 of the Florida Statutes (1979) demonstrated the legislature's intent,
based on the "unique relationship" between the state and the family, to allow the state
to use contempt of court as a means of securing repayment of public monies. The
supreme court held that the acceptance of public assistance for the support of a depen-
dent child vests in the department the authority to proceed with all remedies available
to the child's custodian. 7 Fla. L. Weekly at 126. Still the contempt order in Chapman
was held to be improper because the former husband was not properly notified of the
dissolution of marriage proceedings and the record did not support the determination
that the husband had the ability, to pay the child support. Id. at 124.
117. 336 So. 2d 1237.
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prisoning for a debt. This type of approach would seemingly avoid
much of the confusion surrounding the courts' use of contempt to en-
force property settlements incorporated into final divorce decrees.
Jeffrey F. Thomas
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